Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate theoretically how the price and volume reactions to a public announcement are related to each other, to the announcement's characteristics, and to the traders' beliefs at the time of the announcement. Among many possible sources of (abnormal) trading volume at the time of a public announcement, our emphasis in this study is on differences in the quality of preannouncement information. The study uses a two-period rational expectations model. Traders achieve their optimal portfolios prior to the announcement by trading on what each knows in the preannouncement period. The public announcement changes traders' beliefs and induces them to engage in a new round of trade. It is assumed that traders are diversely informed and differ in the precision of their private prior information; they therefore respond differently to the announcement, and this leads to positive volume.
We obtain three results. First, the price change at the time of announcement is proportional to both the unexpected portion of the announcement and its relative importance across the posterior beliefs of traders. This relative importance is increasing in the precision of the announcement and decreasing in the precision of the preannouncement information.
The second and main result is that trading volume is proportional to both the absolute price change and a measure of differential precision across traders. Price change, as Beaver [1968] points out, reflects the average change in traders' beliefs due to the announcement, whereas trading volume reflects traders' idiosyncratic reactions. In this study the different reactions of traders .are caused by differing precisions of their private information. The newly announced information is relatively more important to traders with less precise private information and thus has a larger impact on their beliefs. Volume reflects the sum of differences in traders' reactions; the change in price measures only the average reaction. As a result, volume is proportional both to price change and to the degree of differential precision. If precision is unobservable, the first and the second results together suggest that trading volume may be a noisier indicator of the precision of the announcement, or the precision of the preannouncement information, than price change. Also, this result is consistent with the empirical findings that abnormal volume is positively correlated with absolute abnormal returns.
The third result is a generalization of Holthausen and Verrecchia [1988] , who analyze price changes at public announcements in a twoperiod model. In their model investors do not possess private information and thus have homogeneous beliefs. They show that the price reaction to an announcement is, on average, increasing in its precision and decreasing in the amount of preannouncement information.! We show that the expected volume and the variance of price change are increasing functions of the precision of the announced information and decreasing functions of the amount of preannouncement public and private information. Therefore, the intuition and results of Holthausen and Verrecchia [1988] insights into how public announcements affect price changes and volume through differing precisions in private prior information. For example, we abstract from trading based on liquidity considerations, portfolio rebalancing, tax effects, etc. We also assume that firms are cross-sectionally independent. In the empirical domain, it is necessary to control for these phenomena in assessing the effect of a public announcement on price changes and volume.
Section 2 describes the model and obtains market equilibrium. Section 3 contains the main results of the paper concerning the market reaction to public announcements. Section 4 summarizes our work with concluding remarks.
The Model and Market Equilibrium
The securities market model we suggest is one of pure exchange, a continuum of traders, and three time periods, referred to as periods 1, 2, and 3. Trading occurs in periods 1 and 2 and consumption in period 3. There are two assets in the economy, a risky asset and a riskless bond. One unit of riskless bond pays off one unit of consumption good in period 3. The return of the risky asset is a random variable, denoted by it, and is realized in period 3. It is assumed that Ct is normally distributed with mean d and precision (inverse of variance) h. market opens and traders buy and sell securities at the competitive market prices.
In period 2 there is a public announcement of a signal h2 = C + v, where v is normally distributed with mean 0 and precision n. It is assumed that all random variables are mutually independent.8 We study the market reaction to the announcement of 52 in period 2. The market opens again in period 2 and there is another round of trading. In period 3 the return of the risky asset is realized and consumption occurs.
Traders are risk averse and their preferences can be represented by negative exponential utility functions with risk tolerance ri, i.e., Ui(WL) = -exp(-(Wi/ri). Trader i's final wealth Wi can be written as Wi = Ei + P1xi + (P2 -P,)Dli + (CZ -P2)D2i, where P1 and P2 are the prices of the risky asset in periods 1 and 2, and D1i and D2, are trader i's holding of the risky asset at the end of periods 1 and 2, respectively. It is assumed that the set Ir-} is uniformly bounded.9
Traders are heterogeneous in terms of risk tolerances (ri) and they differ in terms of their private information in period 1 (i,) and its precision (se). Thus, we model the simple observation that some traders are better informed than others and hold different expectations. This difference in information quality plays a central role in the trading volume reaction to public announcements analyzed later in the paper.
After observing available signals, traders also condition on the market price of the risky asset when choosing their demand. Each trader realizes that the prices for risky securities in the two trading periods, P1 and P2, (potentially) reflect the information held by other traders. In a rational expectations equilibrium, traders make self-fulfilling conjectures about the relation between prices and traders information.
Let a linear conjecture of P1 and P2 be written as: is equivalent to IS1, 52, it, P1, P21 because one can be generated from the other.
There are two possible types of equilibria in this market. In one, traders expect that the two prices fully reveal all private information and these expectations are fulfilled. In the other, equilibrium prices are not fully revealing.
To explain the fully-revealing equilibrium, suppose that traders conjecture that B1 $ B2. Then, from (3) and (4), Ci = (B241 -B1,2)/(B2 -B1). Since q1 and q2 are known in period 2, Ci is also known. Once the return of the risky asset is perfectly revealed, the equilibrium price, P2, must equal the return, u.10 At P2 = Ct, traders have no incentive to trade (or not to trade). In period 1 traders know that the risky return will be revealed in period 2, and thus the equilibrium in period 1 is the same as that in the one-period model of Hellwig [1980] and others. As a result, the market price reacts to the announcement in period 2 and volume is indeterminate in the sense that any level of trading volume (including . Both use two-period noisy rational expectations models in order to capture the price and volume reactions to the second-period public announcement and both obtain a fully revealing and a partially revealing equilibrium. The major difference in the two models is in the preannouncement information structure. In Grundy and McNichols [1989] , traders' preannouncement information consists of a common prior and private signals with a common error as well as idiosyncratic errors. The idiosyncratic errors have the same precision. As a result, there is no volume in the partially-revealing equilibrium. In the fully-revealing equilibrium traders observe the market price and correct their idiosyncratic errors which results in positive volume.
12 It is difficult to suggest which equilibrium is more interesting on purely theoretical grounds. One possible approach is to consider a sequence of finite economies of which the present economy is the limit and to see which equilibrium is the limit of the equilibria of the sequence of economies. Another is to consider a sequence of economies in which the correlation between the supplies in the two trading periods converges to one as in the present model. Both approaches are difficult to implement, however, because they do not appear to yield linear equilibria. 
~~~~~~~~~~
The equilibrium condition that the linear price conjecture is selffulfilling dictates that (2) and (7) For (6), (7), (8), and (9) to be established as an equilibrium, it has to be verified that the assumption B = B1 = B2 is true. B1 = yi/01 = (r-1 + rst)/(s + r2s2t) = 1/rs, and it was shown that B2 = 1/rs. Therefore, (6), (7), (8), and (9) together with B = 1/rs characterize a unique rational expectations equilibrium in which prices only partially reveal traders' private information.
Price and Volume Reactions to Public Announcements
This section contains the analysis of trading volume and price change at the time of public announcement. From (7) and (9) the price reaction to the announcement of Y2 is: The surprise in the announced information as defined in Proposition 1 is the difference between the announced signal, 52, and an average of traders' expectations of the risky return Ct and, at the same time, of the announcement 52.14 The relation in Proposition 1 captures the spirit of event studies, which are conducted typically to examine the information content of particular announcements. In the case of earnings announcements the change in price and the surprise in this model correspond to abnormal returns and unexpected earnings, respectively. The multiple in the relation, n/K2 = n/(h + m + n + s + r2s2t), is an increasing function of the precision of the announced information, n, which can be interpreted as the information content of the announced information. A greater n implies a more sensitive price reaction to the announcement. When n is zero, there is no price change. On the other hand, n/K2 is a decreasing function of the precision of other information available prior to the announcement. A greater amount of preannouncement information implies that the price reacts less sensitively to the surprise in the announcement.
Using ( For an analysis of trading volume, first rewrite trader i's demand of risky asset in the two trading periods expressed in (8) and (6) using (9) and (7) Proposition 2 can be related to an event study context. In tests of the information content of particular events, such as earnings announcements, Proposition 2 suggests that volume may be a noisier indicator than price change of the information content of the announcement, n, and of the amount of preannouncement information, h, m, and s, which correspond to the prior, public, and private information held at the time of announcement.16 If the measure of differential precision, which functions as noise if it is not observable, is uncorrelated with the information variable of interest, the results of a study using volume will not be biased. However, if the measure of differential precision is systematically related to the information variable of interest, then the use of volume may distort results. For example, if more risk-tolerant traders tend to prefer stocks of smaller firms, the multiple in the relation in Proposition 2 will be greater for smaller firms. Consequently, a volume study which tests the difference in the amount of preannouncement information between large and small firms will produce results that exaggerate the difference.17
Reversing the above argument, the use of volume and returns together could potentially generate insights about the multiple, which depends on traders' risk attitudes and the degree of differential precision among them. If there are reasons to believe that these variables are different across firms, industries, or types of announcements, then one could use volume data to test such conjectures. This line of thinking also offers an alternative way to understand observed differences in volume relative to returns. For example, Jain [1988] reports that the announcements of certain macroeconomic variables such as money supply and consumer price index induce significant abnormal returns but no abnormal volume. On the other hand, many studies document that there are both significant 15 The fact that differences in risk aversion alone do not result in volume is an artifact of the exponential utility function. Differences in risk aversion in conjunction with diverse information generally lead to volume; see, for example, Verrecchia [1981] . 6 Grant [1980] , among others, compare the extent of market reactions between large and small firms to test the difference in the amount of preannouncement information. 17 Our results extend (trivially) to a multiasset model in which asset returns and aggregate supplies are mutually indpendent. Extending the model to a general correlation structure is much more complicated; see Admati [1985] . Therefore, our insights are limited to empirical studies in which cross-sectional differences are investigated and these differences do not depend on cross-sectional correlations. price and volume reactions to earnings announcements. 18 Jain [1988] interprets the difference in volume relative to the absolute price change between the two types of announcements as caused by differences in the degree of differential interpretation among traders. However, even without differential interpretations, we show that volume is influenced by the level of differential precision. Consequently, one must be careful to consider the roles of both differential interpretations and differential precision in making inferences about volume.
Finally, the second equation of Proposition 2 implies that the volume reaction to a public announcement is proportional both to the relative importance of the announced information and to the absolute value of the surprise (plus noise) as defined in Proposition 1. This relation is intuitive and consistent with Bamber's [1987] 
Conclusion
We have examined Beaver's [1968] intuition that the change in price reflects the average change in traders' beliefs, while volume reflects the sum of the differences in traders' reactions to an announcement, using a highly stylized model with strong assumptions. The relatively clean and specific results obtained in this study should thus be interpreted with care, although the general intuition in most of the results is clear and does not seem to depend critically on the simplifying assumptions made. They are also largely consistent with existing empirical findings.
The main result of this paper, that volume may be a noisier indicator of information variables than the change in price, does not necessarily imply that volume studies are redundant or inferior. First, volume studies can to a large extent substitute for returns studies. More important, since volume contains the differences among traders which are averaged out in the returns data, the use of volume in conjunction with returns could identify systematic differences in investors' knowledge or other characteristics which result in different reactions to public announcements across firms or across types of announcements. This paper identifies differences in precision across traders as a potentially important factor influencing volume relative to price change. This intuition could shed light on other interesting issues in accounting and finance related to differences in the quality of investors' information. Using this relation, the objective function above can be written as: 
